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Abstract 
This  article  considers  the  role  of  individual  employee  voice  in  regulating  the  ‘zone  of 
acceptance’ within the employment relationship, and examines the extent to which different 
models  of  collective  voice  inhibit  or  foster  the  operation  of  individual  voice.  It  focuses 
especially on the role of representatives who deal  with  job-level  grievances  who operate 
within contrasted frameworks of collective voice. In one, representation is negotiated with the 
employer, and in the other, it is based on rights established in employment law. The former is 
commonly associated with shop stewards and unions, and the latter with employee delegates 
and  works  councils.  It  is  argued  that  whereas  in  the  negotiated  model  individual  and 
collective voice are substitutes, in the rights-based one they are complements. The article also 
considers how this may alter under dual-channel representation based on both unions and 
councils, which is very common in European workplaces. Britain provides an example of the 
negotiated model, and France of both the rights-based and dual-channel models. These ideas 
are  tested  using  data  from  the  2004  British  and  French  workplace  employment  relations 
surveys, and confirmed using data from the 1998 surveys. 
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1. Introduction 
Employee voice plays a key part in the governance of the employment relationship.  This 
relationship  is  built upon a deal  agreed at  the time of hiring, and which is  continuously 
adapted thereafter. In exchange for a salary, employees agree to let management direct their 
labour between duties included within their ‘zone of acceptance’, that is, the set of tasks over 
which they accept the employer’s right to manage. This zone is rarely codified in great detail, 
as recognised by economic, legal and psychological theories of the employment contract. It 
relies on goodwill, with both parties free to terminate it should the terms no longer benefit 
them. Use of voice can assist both parties by facilitating changes to the zone of acceptance as 
their  needs  evolve,  and  helping  to  avoid  breaches  that  might  otherwise  lead  to  quits  or 
dismissals. Individual level voice, that is to say raising issues directly with management, 
contributes to this process because the decision whether to stay or quit is an individual one. 
Yet it does not exist in a vacuum. In many workplaces, it functions alongside collective voice 
institutions,  at  the  job  level,  with  shop  stewards  and  employee  delegates,  and  at  the 
establishment and enterprise levels, with unions, and works councils. This article explores the 
relationship between individual and collective employee voice in the workplace concentrating 
especially on the relationship with forms of job-level collective voice because they, more than 
higher-level representatives, deal closely with the detailed problems related to the zone of 
acceptance. It considers two models of collective voice, referred to as ‘negotiation-based’ and 
‘rights-based’.  The  first  is  based  on  voluntary  negotiation,  and  typically  comprises  shop 
stewards  and  analogous  union-based  representatives,  and  the  second,  elected  personnel 
delegates who often work closely with works councils. It argues that in the negotiation-based 
model, individual and collective voice will generally function as alternatives, as substitutes, 
whereas in the rights-based model, they support, or complement each other’s action. It also 
examines how this relationship is affected by dual-channel representation, such as is common 
in Europe. It also considers the influence of management-led forms of employee voice, such 
as teams, quality circles, goal-setting and performance appraisal whose use has spread in 
recent decades. Some authors have argued that these have been used as substitutes for other 
forms of employee voice, as a basis for a ‘sophisticated non-union model’ (e.g. Kochan, et 
al., 1986, Guest, 1987), whereas others have argued that they can complement them (Benson, 
2000, Amossé and Wolff, 2008). 
 
This article examines these questions taking the collective voice institutions of Britain and 
France as examples of these different systems of collective voice. At the time of observation, 
Britain  provided  an  example  of  negotiated  voice,  whereas  French  workplaces  provided 
examples of both the rights-based and dual-channel models. The article uses both countries’ 
2004 workplace employment relations surveys, focusing on private establishments with 20 or 
more employees, the population covered by the French survey. The paper examines first the 
underlying theory on the relationship between individual and collective voice in employment 
relationships. Next it presents the data and descriptive differences between the two systems as 
they appear in Britain and France before outlining the statistical method and explaining the 
key variables used. Presentation of the regression results is then followed by a conclusion. 
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2. Theory and Hypotheses 
2.1  Voice and the zone of acceptance 
The role of voice in regulating the zone of acceptance occupies a central place in the modern 
employment relationship (Willman et al, 2006, 2009). The early theories of Coase (1937), 
Barnard (1938: Ch 7), and Simon (1951) emphasised the contractual flexibility provided by 
the zone of acceptance, but did not explore how its limits could be policed to the satisfaction 
of both parties, although it was widely recognised that the freedom to quit and effects on 
employee morale discourage extensive abuse. More recently, psychological contract theories 
have likewise emphasised the zone of acceptance and how its breach may be deterred by 
these means, as well as by individual voice between employees and their line-managers (see, 
Rousseau 1995, Conway and Briner, 2005). Such individual voice also plays a key role when 
incumbent employees negotiate idiosyncratic deals, ‘i-deals’, with their managers (Rousseau 
et al. 2006).  
 
It  is  easy  to  understand  the  contribution  of  individual  voice  to  regulating  the  zone  of 
acceptance. As Williamson (1975) argued, detailed codification of work assignments would 
undermine  the  very  flexibility  that  appeals  to  employers.  This  is  also  recognised  by 
employment  law.  Under  English  law,  a  legally  enforceable  contract  underpins  the 
relationship, but as Collins observes, its purpose is to ‘stabilise expectations’ (Collins, 2006: 
139). Likewise, French employment law distinguishes between minor changes to the zone of 
acceptance, which are deemed to be part of the initial deal, and substantial ones that require 
renegotiation. The line between the two is determined in relation to the initial agreement, and 
hence to the intentions of the two parties when contracting (Lyon-Caen and Pélissier, 1988, 
pp. 306ff). Given this open-endedness, the exercise of voice enables both parties to clarify 
whether  particular  duties  fall  within  the  zone  of  acceptance,  and  to  agree  mutually 
satisfactory adjustments without the need to treat each change as a potential breach. 
 
When Freeman and Medoff (1984) first introduced Hirschman’s (1970) theory of exit and 
voice,  they  focused  on  individual  voice  and  its  collective  alternative  exercised  through 
unions. Other representative forms of collective voice, such as works councils, have also been 
analysed  (e.g.  Sadowski  et  al,  1995).  These  studies  emphasised  the  benefits  of  sharing 
information for labour utilisation and productivity. Since then, the range of voice channels 
considered has greatly expanded, to include ‘management-led’ channels. For example, Batt et 
al. (2002) examine teams, and non-union dispute resolution. Dundon et al. (2004) examine 
forms of voice ranging from the articulation of individual dissatisfaction, through expressions 
of  collective  action,  to  involvement  in  management  decision-making,  and  they  identify 
different channels associated with each: from complaints channels and grievances through to 
quality circles and consultation. There has also been growing interest in individual employee 
voice  within  goal-setting  and  performance  appraisal,  broadening  their  functions  from  the 
traditional emphasis on monitoring (Levy and Williams, 2004). Their growth means that their 
potential influence on the operation of individual and collective channels needs also to be 
addressed.  The  next  sections  explore  the  theoretical  relationship  between  individual  and 
collective channels, and consider how management-led voice may affect them.  
a)  Individual voice and its relationship with the other forms  
The effectiveness with which individual employees can exercise voice in their dealings with 
managers depends on the resources at their disposal. In a free labour market, the ultimate 
sanction for employees, as for their employers, is to terminate the relationship if voice fails to 3 
bring about mutually satisfactory arrangements. Thus, within individual voice relationships, 
there is always an implicit threat of termination: to quit or to dismiss. For employees, the 
main focus of this paper, its credibility depends upon the ease of finding an alternative job. 
This is influenced by the buoyancy of labour demand, and especially whether employees 
have skills that are easily marketable. Likewise, employees with above average ability for 
their occupation will generally be harder to replace, and so are likely to have a more potent 
quit threat than their peers. 
 
Opportunities for informal discussion with management provide an important channel for 
individual employee voice. To manage their zones of acceptance effectively, employees need 
access to managers who are empowered make decisions. This is generally easier in small 
firms where managerial hierarchies are shorter, and procedures tend to be simpler than in 
large firms. Conversely, long hierarchies, and reliance on formal grievance procedures can 
deprive employees of individual voice. Thus managers’ willingness to deal informally and 
directly is likely to enhance individual voice. It is also generally easier for managerial and 
professional employees to raise issues with those who have decision-making power than for 
employees with only basic skills and educational attainments. 
 
For many workers in different circumstances, individual voice is a risky business. They may 
be  penalised  as  troublemakers,  and  thus  discouraged  from  speaking  out  (Freeman  and 
Medoff,  1984).  In  such  cases,  individual  voice  fails.  For  them,  the  alternatives  include 
withdrawal,  such  as  absence  or  quits,  and  silence,  albeit  at  the  price  of  growing 
dissatisfaction because they lack influence to contest the divergence between the employer’s 
changing job demands and their own zones of acceptance (Van Dyne et al. 2003). They may 
also seek to exercise voice collectively.  
 
In summary, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
 
H1: Employees’ individual voice will be enhanced by the strength of their outside option, the 
marketability of their skills; 
 
H2: Management’s willingness to deal directly and informally with employees about work 
grievances will enhance individual voice; 
 
H3: Employees who lack voice are more likely to be dissatisfied with their conditions, and to 
withdraw through absence or quits. 
b)  Two models of collective voice 
When analysing the position of the zone of acceptance in the negotiated and rights-based 
models, it is helpful to distinguish two levels of collective or representative voice: at job and 
work group level, for example by shop or union stewards and elected employee delegates; 
and at workplace and higher levels, by unions and works councils. As the zone of acceptance 
relates to the jobs of individual employees, and their understanding of the deal underpinning 
the sale of their labour services, the key representatives will quite logically be the stewards 
and employee delegates. The contents of individual jobs are often quite idiosyncratic, and so 
give rise to particularistic grievances, whereas deliberations at the workplace level tend to 
deal  with  whole classes of problems. When they  deal  with  individual  cases it is  usually 
because they raise important general issues. 
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Freeman and Medoff’s theory was initially framed with the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ model of union 
bargaining  in  mind,  whereby  unions  seek  collective  bargaining  rights  with  individual 
employers on behalf of certain categories of employees. Their theory does not distinguish 
strongly between job and enterprise level representatives because they are interdependent. 
The  stewards’  status  and  protection  from  intimidation  are  underwritten  by  the  union’s 
agreement  with  management,  usually  backed  up  by  the  possibility  of  pressure  tactics. 
Likewise, the union’s effectiveness in the eyes of its members is bolstered by the activities of 
its shop stewards who can more easily deal with issues  closest to the jobs of individual 
employees. 
 
In several continental European countries, alongside the negotiated form, a different set of 
institutions provides collective voice, notably statutory workplace representation by specially 
elected job level representatives and works councils. The former fulfil many of the voice 
functions of shop stewards, taking up individual employees’ grievances with management, 
either on their behalf or jointly with them. In contrast to the voluntary institutions, their status 
is protected by employment law rather than by collective strength, and the employer is legally 
obliged to provide for elections, and to deal with those elected. To distinguish the statutory-
based  job-level  representatives  from  their  union-based  counterparts,  this  article  uses  the 
French term ‘personnel delegates’ (délégués du personnel). At the workplace level, collective 
representation,  on  key  issues  except  pay,  is  provided  through  works  councils,  to  which 
employees also have a statutory right, and their powers are established by law. A common 
feature of such models is the presence of an employment size threshold set by law. Thus in 
small  plants,  personnel  delegates  will  provide  the  sole  statutory  representative  channel, 
whereas in larger plants there will be both delegates and works councils.  
 
When the state accords such legal rights usually, and quite consistently, it imposes two key 
obligations: a peace obligation and universal coverage of all employees. In their dealings with 
management, both parties should abstain from industrial pressure tactics, and representatives 
should make their services available to all groups in the workplace. As these principles have 
become  embedded,  new  responsibilities  have  been  attributed,  notably  in  the  areas  of 
employment  security  and  training.  Taken  together,  these  features  impose  very  different 
organisational  imperatives  on these two types  of collective voice channels  giving rise to 
radically different relationships with individual voice: as a substitute for individual voice in 
the  negotiation-based  model,  and  a  complement  for  it  in  the  rights-based  model.  Key 
influences  on  the  relationship  with  individual  voice  concern  mobilisation,  the  peace 
obligation, and coverage. 
 
When collective voice depends upon a voluntary agreement, the employer retains the right to 
withdraw. As a result, the union and its stewards have to sustain the employer’s interest by a 
mix of carrot and stick: productivity gains from improved information flows, and the threat of 
collective sanctions. The latter depend upon the union’s ability to mobilise its members to 
maintain recognition and bargaining rights (Crouch, 1982). These organisational imperatives 
include its ability to build coalitions of workers around issues of general concern; to sustain 
itself by recruiting new members; and to manage these coalitions as an effective bargaining 
force (Traxler, 1995). In other words, this form of collective voice has to represent individual 
employees’ problems by a process of ‘interest aggregation’, translating them into issues of 
more general concern around which it can mobilise, and maintain an effective bargaining 
coalition.  This  may  not  suit  all  individuals  and  groups,  especially  if  they  already  have 
effective individual voice on account of their marketable skills. However, to maximise its 5 
collective strength, the union needs to bind such groups into the collective channel because 
otherwise their search for individual solutions will diminish its power, enabling the employer 
to ‘divide and rule’ (Crouch, 1982 Olson, 1971). One manifestation of the tension between 
what Crouch called ‘the drive to combine’ and individual group interest is the smaller wage 
differential in union than in non-union environments (Freeman, 1980, Card et al., 2004). Such 
factors could cause some with marketable skills not only to opt out of collective voice, but 
also to move to non-union firms. 
 
The peace obligation is also critical to the relationship between individual and collective 
voice.  This  can  be  seen  by  considering  the  zone  of  acceptance  in  relation  to  integrative 
(problem-solving) and distributive discussions
1. Many of the adjustments to jobs handled by 
management authority take place through an integrative approach. The purpose of the zone of 
acceptance is that changes in task assignments should be handled by simple communications 
between employees and their managers in an integrative way because they do not affect the 
initial deal over pay and work. There are of course many other, larger, changes that affect 
distributive outcomes and so require renegotiation. Statutory-based delegates and councils are 
well-suited to the integrative questions because they are bound by a peace obligation, 
whereas unions and shop stewards have a comparative advantage for the second, being free 
of such restrictions, although dependent on bargaining power and mobilisatio n. In between, 
there is a large overlapping zone comprising issues that could be resolved by either method. 
They could be treated as distributive questions, or, with a bit of imagination, in a broadly 
‘cost neutral’ way, that is having only a small or no net effect on distribution (Figure 1). 
 
In this zone, workers who are well-endowed with individual bargaining power would find 
their  own  individual  voice  in  competition  with  collective  voice.  They  can  more  easily 
negotiate their own special arrangements with management, such as Rousseau’s ‘i-deals’, if 
they can be handled on a one-off, individual, basis. It is often easier to resolve a single issue 
in isolation, and the impact on costs is much smaller than if the concession is extended to all 
other employees, as a union would be inclined to seek. Thus, for employees with sufficient 
market power, individual negotiation would appear the more attractive option, and individual 
and shop steward voice would be in competition. Because personnel delegates are bound by a 
peace  obligation,  they  are  under  pressure  to  work  with  management  to  find  cost  neutral 
solutions that do not require pressure tactics, and this will often favour individual adjustments 
and  so  accommodate  individual  voice  more  easily.  Their  additional  attributions  on 
employment  security  and  training  also  promote  a  mutually  supportive  relationship  with 
individual voice.
2 The first restricts  managers’ ability to use the dismissal threat to impose 
changes, and the second can assist provision of additional skills required for new duties. 
 
Although stewards and delegates each operate within a framework that protects them, and 
comprises  multiple  levels  of  collective  voice,  it  is  their  action  at  workgroup  level  that 
provides  employees  with  help  for  individual  job-related  issues.  Thus  the  relationships  of 
substitution and complementarity with individual voice should be most intense at that level:  
 
H4a Shop stewards will be negatively related to individual voice; 
H4b Personnel delegates will be associated with greater individual voice. 
                                                 
1 I am grateful to one of the referees for suggesting this line of analysis. 
2 In France, in smaller establishments without works councils, personnel delegates assume many of the functions 
relating to employment security and training.  6 
The influence of unions and councils on individual voice is mediated through their respective 
job level representatives, and this is shaped by the nature of the ties between them. Stewards 
and unions are strongly interdependent  as  the  former depend upon the union’s ability to 
mobilise pressure for their protection. Both are bound by a shared dependence on negotiated 
recognition, so both can be expected to discourage individual voice. Although councils are 
part of a framework that favours individual voice, their part in the division of labour may 
cause them to have a weak or even negative relationship. They get the conflictual cases that 
could not be resolved at job level, and they tend to work by applying general principles to 
individual cases, both of which imply a strained relationship with individual voice. In this 
respect, they experience some of the same tensions as workplace level union bodies. Thus 
employees’ overall impression could be that delegates are supportive of individual voice, 
whereas councils are less interested. However, unlike unions that provide essential back-up to 
their stewards, delegates have their own independent legal protections. Indeed, in France, in 
small firms below the legal threshold for councils, and even in some medium-sized ones, 
delegates mostly function in the absence of councils. Even when councils are present, it is 
usually the delegates  who are in  the front-line for individual employee  grievances.  Thus 
many employees could quite easily associate delegates but not councils with effective support 
for their individual dealings with management. Thus:  
 
H5a Union voice will be negatively related to individual voice;  
H5b Councils may have an indeterminate relationship with individual voice. 
 
The relationship between works councils and individual voice is further strained when they 
operate as a dual channel of collective voice alongside a strong union presence in the same 
workplace. With the dual channel, it would normally be in the employer’s interest to opt for 
grievance  channels  covered  by  the  peace  obligation:  to  keep  distributive  and  integrative 
issues separate for reasons discussed earlier. In contrast, it is likely to be in the union’s 
interest to emphasise the distributive aspect of employees’ grievances and demands. This 
would boost its prestige in relation to the works council. If the union is strong enough to 
negotiate a local agreement with the employer, it would likely seek to consolidate its position 
by encouraging councils to seek general, solidarity-oriented, solutions to grievances, and so 
discourage  individual  voice.  Thus  a  sixth  hypothesis  reinforces  H5b:  in  dual  channel 
workplaces, strong union presence will cause councils to inhibit individual voice. 
 
H6: In workplaces where unions and councils provide dual channels, a strong union presence 
will cause councils to have a negative relationship with individual voice. 
 
Dependence  on  employer  agreement  compared  with  universality  of  representation  rights 
accorded by law can affect the coverage of collective voice, and hence the attractiveness of 
individual employee voice. When coverage is uneven, those with marketable skills have good 
reason to maintain their capacity for individual negotiation: their next job may be in a non-
union workplace or in a non-union grade. As a result, they will often be reluctant to pool their 
resources  with  others  for  collective  voice.  Thus,  individual  voice  will  tend  to  be  more 
polarised  in  the  voluntary,  union,  model,  being  concentrated  among  those  who  have  the 
necessary individual bargaining power. 
 
H7: Individual marketability will have a stronger effect on individual voice in the negotiated 
than  in  the  rights-based  model  because  of  the  differences  in  coverage  between  the  two 
systems. 7 
c)  Management-led forms of voice 
The spread of management-led forms of employee voice means that one has to take their 
presence into account when exploring the relationship between individual and representative 
voice. As will be seen, they bear no simple relationship with employee voice: much depends 
upon the circumstances. Four main factors are commonly believed to shape the employer’s 
‘demand  for  voice’,  including  improved  information  flows,  possible  biases  in  existing 
channels, improved motivation, and high exit costs (Willman et al., 2006). These give a clue 
as to the likely impact on the other forms of voice. Management may suspect that the quantity 
and quality of information flows are subject to different biases under the two regimes. It often 
believes  that  unions  distort  information  for  bargaining  advantage  and  for  internal 
organisational reasons, whereas statutory channels can be legalistic. Thus management-led 
channels can often appear better focused on the key issues for the business. Managers may 
also seek to develop voice because they believe it enhances motivation, for example, by 
raising workplace trust. This may be increased by greater management-led communication, 
or  it  may  require  management  to  go  further  and  ‘tie  its  hands’.  In  strongly  unionised 
workplaces, an agreement with the union would normally provide the necessary commitment, 
but  in  weakly organised ones,  it is possible that  employers would prefer to  engage with 
statutory-based  representatives  because  of  their  legal  status.  Finally,  where  organisation-
specific skills make exit costs high, management may seek to develop its own voice channels 
in order to prevent disagreements from sliding into quits or dismissals. It may do this either 
because it believes existing employee voice is not very effective, or because it fears a hold-up 
by the union,  for  example, it fears that  its  investments  in  training will  put  it in  a weak 
bargaining position. In this context, it is likely that management would consider a works 
council bound by a peace obligation to pose less of a threat than a trade union, which is free 
to use pressure tactics.  
 
Management-led channels are likely to pose the greatest challenge to other voice channels 
when  they  are  relatively  independent  from  direct  management  control.  All  four  types 
mentioned earlier display this characteristic. In the case of team working, Batt et al (2002) 
observe  that  it  can  provide  employee  voice  by  increasing  involvement  and  enabling 
dissatisfied  employees  to  voice  their  concerns,  thus  provide  an  alternative  to  quitting. 
However, its effect depends upon whether teams are ‘consultative’ or ‘substantive’: the first 
including problem-solving groups and quality circles, and the second, practices such as semi-
autonomous groups. They argue that although both forms provide scope for employee voice, 
substantive teams will provide more effective voice because of their greater autonomy.  
 
Grievance procedures provide another form of employee voice which is often management-
led, particularly in the large number of non-union workplaces. As Batt and her co-authors 
observe,  these  too  vary  in  the  degree  to  which  management  controls  the  process.  They 
distinguish four kinds: management review, peer review, non-union arbitration and union-
based procedures. Fear of reprisals by management may often discourage use of grievance 
procedures,  which  Boroff  and  Lewin  (1997)  found  to  be  significant  even  in  unionised 
workplaces. Thus, Batt et al. argue that greater independence from management will facilitate 
more effective employee voice, the test being  measured by the effect  on quits.  Whereas 
dealing  with  grievances  informally  often  enhances  individual  voice,  insisting  on  formal 
procedures is likely to have the opposite effect. 
 
Employee  consultative  committees  (ECCs)  are  also  widely  regarded  as  management-led. 
Although present in both union and non-union workplaces, their use had stalled during the 8 
period before 2004 (Willman et al., 2009). The same study, which used the British Workplace 
Employment  Relations  Surveys  between  1990  and  2004,  also  highlights  the  growth  of 
management communication through team briefings  and workplace meetings.  Like Batt’s 
study, this one used reduced quit rates as an indicator of effective voice, finding lower rates 
associated with more independent forms of voice.
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In recent years apprai sal and goal-setting have attracted  growing  attention as forms of 
employee  voice,  although  one  should  distinguish  their  two  faces:  monitor ing  and 
involvement. The first deprive s  employees of voice,  whereas the second  can  enhance it. 
Emphasis on the monitoring function remains strong in the principal-agent literature (see for 
example, Brown and Heywood, 2005, Addison and Belfield, 2008). In contrast, in the HRM 
literature, Cawley et al (1998: 628) concluded their meta-study observing that the monitoring 
approach is no longer consistent with organisations that are moving towards involvement -
oriented climates. There has been a growing emphasis on appraisal for involvement, and on 
the importance of the ‘trial’ or ‘due process’ model in which the effectiveness of goal-setting 
and  its  motivational  functions  depend  upon  employee  voice  and  influence  (Folger  and 
Cropanzano, 2001, Levy and Williams, 2004). 
 
Thus, the effect of management-led channels on other forms of voice is likely to depend on 
how far management allows them to function independently, and on the circumstances in 
which  they  operate.  From  the  earlier  discussion,  it  seems  likely  that  management-led 
channels will complement works councils, and compete with the unions, and probably also 
with  individual  voice.  However,  empirical  research  is  not  conclusive  on  this.  Rivalry, 
especially under the union system appeared to be endorsed by the early empirical research on 
new forms of human resource management. This argued that management-led voice was in 
competition with union-led forms of collective voice, and often sought to undermine them 
(for example, Kochan et al., 1986). However, later work, often drawing on workplace survey 
data, appears to show that management-led and union-based voice channels coexist in the 
same workplaces, possibly for prolonged periods, which casts some doubt on the degree to 
which  they  compete  (Sisson  1993,  Benson,  2000).    Evidence  from  the  three  French 
workplace employment relations surveys for 1990/92, 1998 and 2004, indicates widespread 
coexistence of representative and management-led channels, without any tendency for one to 
substitute for the others (Amossé and Wolff, 2008).  
 
This theory and evidence indicates an eighth hypothesis: 
 
H8:  Management-led  channels  will  have  most  influence  on  employee  voice  when  they 
function independently from management, in which case they are more likely to compete 
with the negotiated than the rights model. 
3. Britain and France as Illustrations of the Two Collective Voice Systems 
Examples of these two collective voice systems can be found in Britain and France where 
they  are  embodied  in  their  respective  employment  laws.  In  Britain,  the  main  form  of 
                                                 
3 The authors found that establishments with union and dual voice channels had consistently lower quit rates 
than those with either exclusively non-union channels or no formal channels at all (Willman et al. 2009: 110-
112). 9 
collective voice in the workplace depends upon the employer’s decision to recognise a trade 
union  for  collective  bargaining  purposes.  Continued  recognition  also  depends  upon  the 
employer’s  decision.  The  1999  Employment  Relations  Act  bolstered  employee  rights  for 
union  representation,  and  recognition  procedures  were  strengthened.  However,  the  bar 
required to force an unwilling employer was set high: 50% of the employees in the proposed 
bargaining group should be union members, or 40% and a majority of those voting in a ballot. 
The strong presumption was that voluntary arrangements were to be preferred. Employers 
have long been free to  set up  employee consultation committees (ECCs) to discuss non-
bargaining issues, and this is quite widely practiced. Consultation rights were strengthened by 
the European Works Council Directive (94/45/EC) enacted in 1999, and the Information and 
Consultation  of  Employees  Regulations  Act  2004.  The  former  affects  a  relatively  small 
number of workplaces, in multinational companies, and the latter was not yet in force at the 
time of the survey. 
 
In contrast, in France, both systems operate widely, but not always in the same workplaces. 
Under French employment law, employers of establishments with more than ten employees 
are obliged to organise the election of personnel delegates (délégué du personnel), and those 
with at least 50 employees are similarly obliged to organise elections for a works council 
(comité d’entreprise). The burden of proof is on the employer to show that its employees do 
not want either institution. The delegates’ main function is to represent employee grievances 
to the employer, and they benefit from legal protection against victimisation. Although the 
primary  function  of  French  works  councils  is  consultation  -  unions  deal  with  pay 
negotiations - legislation has enabled them to build up considerable powers over a range of 
workplace issues  including training  and lay-offs.
4 Employees also  have  the right to raise 
grievances directly with management, and delegates often represent those who fail to get a 
satisfactory answer. Such grievances may also relate to pay, for example , if the employee 
believes the wrong pay rate has been applied, or she has been denied an increase. These 
delegates provide the main channel for grievances that in Britain would go though shop 
stewards  or  grievance  procedures.  In  both  countries,  many  griev ances  are  resolved 
informally, directly with management. 
 
In common with most countries that have works councils, in France, in many workplaces, 
councils and unions coexist. In France, independent unions on paper appear more secure than 
in Britain, They are empowered to negotiate agreements with employers. However, inter -
union competition means that they have to strike a difficult balance between a militant line in 
order to mobilise support, and moderation to avoid being undercut should a more moderate 
union sign the agreement that will bind the employer. There are also legally prescribed, if 
time-consuming, procedures by which employers may terminate collective agreements. Thus, 
despite more extensive rights to negotiate in France than in Britain, unions face a similar need 
to mobilise in order to sustain relations with employers. French unions also have  the right to 
appoint shop stewards (délégué syndical) in workplaces, although these will tend to be in 
larger establishments. These stewards are the unions’ local workplace agents, and are closer 
to  ordinary  employees,  but  unlike  the  personnel  delegates,  they  depend  on  the  union’s 
strength for their effectiveness. Unlike delegates, they may also negotiate agreements. 
 
                                                 
4 In France,  the employer chairs the  works council, thus  making it  unsuitable for industrial action, and so 
provides a functional equivalent of the peace obligation. 10 
French unions gain a good deal of influence owing to the coexistence of the negotiated and 
statutory voice channels in many workplaces, especially large ones. For example, in large 
workplaces their stewards are ex officio members of the council. This explains why, in 2004, 
46% of French employees worked in establishments with a union presence, yet just 6% were 
union  members.  Indeed,  whereas  membership  had  remained  static  over  the  previous  ten 
years, union workplace presence had increased from 37% to 46% (Amossé and Wolff, 2009). 
Thus it would seem that, especially in the private sector, the unions’ low membership and 
political  fragmentation  make  mobilisation  difficult.  As  a  result,  they  have  to  accept  the 
division  of  functions  between  themselves  and  delegates  and  councils.  Evidence  for  the 
relative prestige of the delegates and councils can be seen in the 75% of employees who vote 
in their elections, compared with the 6% of union members. In other words, although unions 
draw strength from working within these institutions, they have to accept the rules governing 
their operation, especially in firms where they are weak. Thus, workplace representation will 
tend to be dominated by the statutory representative institutions in smaller establishments 
where unions are weak, but in large firms where unions have a stronger following they will 
be able to influence how the rights-based channels operate. 
 
Based on the 2004 workplace employment relations surveys of the two countries, Table 1 
summarizes  information  on  their  key  workplace  representative  institutions  in  private 
establishments  with  20  or  more  employees.  It  shows  substantial  differences.  Voluntary 
institutions  in  Britain  cover  a  much  smaller  percentage  of  establishments  compared  with 
either statutory or voluntary institutions in France. The percentage of workplaces with a shop 
steward is 10% in Britain compared with France where 72% have a delegate and 37% a shop 
steward. In France, personnel delegates are much more widespread than shop stewards except 
in  large  workplaces.  In  Britain,  just  18%  of  establishments  had  employee  consultation, 
compared with 33% in France with statutory works councils (50% for those above the legal 
threshold  of  50  employees).  These  figures  are  higher  if  we  include  medium-sized  plants 
where the functions of delegate and council may be merged, 46% and 81% respectively
5. A 
similar difference emerges for coverage by plant or company pay agreements, 21% in Britain 
against 64% in France. 
 
Turning to individual voice (Table 2), the two countries’ workplace surveys do not provide a 
refined survey instrument to measure different aspects of individual voice. Both use a single 
question in the employee questionnaires. In Britain, employees were asked ‘Ideally, who do 
you think would best represent you in dealing with managers [in this workplace] about the 
following?’,  and  were  offered  a  menu  of  replies  which  included  a  number  of  possible 
representatives, from unions to other employees, together with the option: ‘I would be best 
represented by myself’. In France, employees were asked whether they agreed or not with a 
series  of  statements  about  representation  in  their  workplace,  including  ‘Employees  can 
defend their own interests directly’. 
 
In both countries, substantial percentages believe that employees can look after their own 
interests  in  their  workplaces.  In  Britain,  about  50%  thought  they  could  best  represent 
themselves for getting a pay increase and over discipline, and over 60% thought they could 
do so for training and making complaints. In France, just under 40% agreed that employees 
                                                 
5 Under French employment law, establishments with 50-150 employees may merge the delegate and councils 
into a single body encompassing both sets of rights, the ‘délégation unique’. 11 
can look after their own interests themselves. In France, the same question was put to the 
employee representative and management respondents. Respectively, 51% and 86% replied 
that employees in their establishments were capable of representing themselves directly. In 
Table 2 it is also possible to see how perceptions of individual voice vary with the presence 
of  collective  voice.  Thus  for  pay,  34%  of  employees  in  British  establishments  with  a 
recognised  union  reported  individual  voice,  but  nearly  60%  did  so  in  non-union  plants. 
Likewise in France, 37% of those in plants with representative institutions reported individual 
voice compared with 44% in those without. At first sight, it seems that in both countries they 
are to some degree substitutes. 
 
Insight into the way the more visible aspects of individual voice work in practice can be 
gleaned from both surveys, although the questions are not directly comparable. Employees’ 
direct access to management to resolve individual grievances is important in both countries. 
In Britain, WERS data show that the great majority of pay, grading and working conditions 
grievances is resolved informally with management outside the formal grievance procedure, 
and  without  involvement  of  employee  representatives
6. Indeed, WERS indi cates that the 
influence  of  employee  representatives comes into  play  mostly  within  formal  grievance 
procedures. Further insight is possible for France because its survey shows both the first and 
second ports of call for certain individual grievances, which  illustrates the complementarity 
between  individual  and  representative  voice.  Table  3  shows  management  respondent 
accounts for individual grievances relating to working conditions, including work schedules, 
work pace and safety. As in Britain, in the great  majority of establishments, employees go 
first to management. In about a fifth they go to delegates or councils, and less than 5% to 
shop stewards. Direct access to management, especially senior management, provides an 
opportunity for individual voice. The frequency with which delegates or councils serve as the 
second  port  of  call  illustrates  how  these  channels  support  individual  voice  when  an 
immediate solution is not forthcoming. Although the question does not distinguish between 
grievances going to the  delegates and those to works councils, other information from the 
survey shows that the delegates are the key actors. Considering grievances on working 
conditions and pay, it is two to three times more common for them to go through the elected 
institutions when there are delegates in the workplace than when there is only a council. The 
key role of the delegates is confirmed by information from the employee representatives’ 
questionnaire which shows that it is twice a common for such grievances to be handled by 
delegates as by the council, and they are more likely to obtain a solution, although in the 
latter case councils may well have to deal with cases that eluded both individual voice and 
representation by the delegates.
7 
                                                 
6 Grievances dealt with ‘informally’ refer to establishments that report a grievance of a particular kind has been 
raised during the past 12 months, but which did not deal with any grievances through their formal procedure. By 
implication,  these  were  dealt  with  outside  the  procedure,  that  is,  informally.  Thus,  24%  of  establishments 
reported grievances relating to pay, but of these, only 6% reported use of the formal grievance procedure, 
implying  that  18%  were  dealt  with  informally.  For  working  conditions,  the  figures  were  16%  and  10% 
respectively for informal and formal channels. The WERS variables used were htype and hprocedu. 
7 This can be done by examining employee representative replies relating to the volumes of grievances and the 
rates of resolution respectively for delegates and councils.  Individual grievances on working conditions and 
absence of a promotion or pay increase were roughly twice as frequent for delegates as for councils, whereas for 
dismissals  which  involve  application  of  established  procedures,  the  rates  were  about  the  same.  The 
attractiveness of the delegate channel is also evident in the higher rates of resolution compared with councils: 
51% compared with 41%, although the latter may reflect that councils get the more difficult cases.  12 
4. Statistical Method and of Key Variables 
Because this paper analyses voice models using international comparison, a great deal of care 
has been taken to match variables across the two countries’ surveys (see Appendix Tables 1 
and 2). In practice, the major institutional differences between the two systems mean that 
many similar functions have to be explored with differently phrased questions. As explained 
below,  the  key  measures  of  individual  voice  comprise  employee  perceptions  of  its 
effectiveness. That said, a key merit of the two surveys is that they combine employer and 
employee  questionnaires  making  it  possible  to  link  the  employee  measures  of  individual 
voice  and  marketability  to  the  institutional  characteristics  of  their  workplaces.  To  avoid 
problems of common method variance, the regressions use just the one attitudinal variable 
from the employee survey, all others being of a descriptive nature. Details of the survey 
questions and the variable means are given in appendix. 
 
Employee perceptions of individual voice, and of the fairness of their pay are captured from 
the employee questionnaire shown in Table 2 above. Both sets of questions have been used in 
a number of studies looking at employee attitudes towards union voice (for example Belfield 
and Heywood 2004, Bender and Sloane, 1998, and Bryson et al 2004), and on the effects of 
various policies on employee satisfaction (for example, Harley, 2001, Peccei and Lee, 2005) 
and  more  generally  on  employee  reports  about  their  working  conditions  (Green,  2008). 
Similar questions were used in 1998 and in 2004. The significance of the results obtained by 
these authors lends confidence to the general validity of the questions.  
 
Nevertheless, employee perceptions of the efficacy of individual voice in their workplaces 
could be upwardly biased. They may overstate its effectiveness to compensate for feelings of 
powerlessness. The variables used in this paper compare individual employees within each 
country  so  that a  generalised upwards bias,  and one that differed between the countries, 
should not affect the results. The individual voice questions were also compared with other 
employee influence questions which could not be matched between the two surveys, and they 
were found to be consistent.
8 Additional tests of the validity of this measure are discu ssed 
after the regression results (Table 5). 
 
The marketability of skills strengthens employees’ individual bargaining power so they may 
express individual voice more securely. This can be assessed by a number of indicators. More 
highly educated and professional workers generally have more transferable skills because of 
their high level of analytical and problem-solving knowledge compared with those who learn 
their skills on the job. High ability workers also usually have more outside options. A rough 
indicator can be found in whether someone is paid above the average for their occupation, 
and  so  earns  more  than  those  with  similar  human  capital  investments.  Recently  hired 
workers, measured by short service, generally have more marketable skills, and conversely 
for those with long service. 
 
                                                 
8 In Britain, the questions from the employee questionnaire related to their overall satisfaction with involvement 
in decision-making in their workplace (QB9), and how good were their managers at allowing employees or their 
representatives to influence decisions (QB8c). In France, employees were asked whether their fear of losing 
their job motivated them and whether job insecurity held them back in their work (Q12, Q13). In both cases, the 
questions were included in a version of the equation used in Table 3, and obtained the expected sign and were 
significant. 13 
Ease of access to management may facilitate individual voice. Thus in small firms with short 
managerial hierarchies, more frequent interactions with managers open up opportunities to 
raise issues that would be more difficult in larger workplaces. This effect is captured in part 
by establishment size, although size may reflect other influences as well, such as greater 
formalisation.  Access  also  depends  upon  management’s  willingness  to  deal  directly  and 
informally, and hence on the design of grievance processes. Their influence can be gauged by 
the frequency of resolving issues outside formal procedures. 
 
The  presence  of  collective  voice  institutions  is  based  on  the  management  questionnaires 
concerning  workplace  employee  representatives,  union  stewards  and  personnel  delegates, 
consultation  committees,  works  councils,  and  coverage  by  a  workplace  or  enterprise 
collective  agreement.  Local  union  organisation  is  measured  by  presence  of  a  local  pay 
agreement. The effect of dual channel representation is captured by identifying workplaces 
with both councils and local agreements. 
 
Management-led  voice  is  measured  by  the  presence  of  teams,  quality  circles,  workplace 
meetings and performance appraisals. Employee consultation and grievance procedures are 
also often management-led, notably in non-union workplaces, but often involve unions when 
they  are  present  in  the  workplace.  As  noted  earlier,  the  effect  of  management-led  on 
individual  voice  could  be  positive  or  negative  depending  on  its  independence  from 
management control. This is measured by interactions with representative institutions on the 
assumption that their presence will enhance independence.  
 
Some control variables are needed to capture the effects of different types of work situation 
and industries. More autonomous and more technically demanding work will often involve 
greater delegation and hence more employee discretion over task assignments, and hence 
greater scope for individual voice. These effects are partially captured by job autonomy and 
use of computers, based on the management questionnaire. Other variables exist in the two 
surveys, but could not be matched. Large investments in training raise the cost of exit. These 
are captured by employer training expenditures, and payment of ‘efficiency wages’ (paying 
above the average for the sector). On the other hand, high turnover and absence rates signal 
low exit costs as high costs would induce management to adopt policies to cut absence and 
turnover.  The  British  survey  provides  direct  measures  of  these,  whereas  the  French  one 
provides indirect measures only, asking employers whether they experienced problems of 
recruitment and absence for different occupational groups. Employment size is represented 
by categorical variables chosen to reflect the various legal thresholds: 50 employees for a 
council, and 50-199 for combining delegates and councils into a single channel (délégation 
unique).  Nine  sectoral  groups  were  matched,  and  sectoral  dummies  were  used  taking 
manufacturing as the benchmark. 
5. Regression Results  
The regression results show that the marketability of employees’ skills is associated with 
stronger individual voice in both countries (Tables 4a and 4b). The result is much sharper in 
Britain than in France, for reasons that will be examined shortly. In Britain, higher levels of 
education, being paid above the average for one’s occupation, and holding professional or 
technician qualifications all boost perceived voice. Possessing organisation specific skills, as 
indicated  by  long  service  diminishes  perceived  individual  voice.  These  indicators  of 
individual  marketability  hold  their  strength  and  significance  as  representative  and 14 
management-led voice measures are added, as they do when establishment characteristics and 
sector are included. In France, being a managerial or professional employee is associated 
with greater individual voice when size and sector are included, but the other measures are 
not  significant.  These  results  provide  strong  support  for  hypotheses  H1  in  Britain,  but 
somewhat less so in France. 
 
Strong support for the influence of job-level representation on individual voice emerges from 
both countries’ data. Union-based shop stewards are negatively associated with individual 
voice,  supporting  hypothesis  H4a.  Personnel  delegates  are  positively  associated  with 
individual  voice,  confirming  hypothesis  H4b.  Because  multiple  representation  channels 
increase with establishment size, the analysis for France was repeated in small, medium and 
large workplaces (Appendix Table 3). In small workplaces, stewards and delegates maintain 
their respective influences on individual voice, and delegates continue to do so in medium-
sized  ones.  It  is  difficult  to  estimate  separate  effects  in  large  establishments  because  all 
collective channels coexist in the great majority of them, as shown in the right-hand columns 
of the table). Including establishment size interactions for delegates and stewards in France 
considerably strengthens both  coefficients,  while maintaining their respective  signs.  Such 
interactions were not statistically significant in Britain. The interactions show that both types 
of  job  level  representatives  have  less  influence  on  individual  voice  in  larger  plants,  the 
reasons for which become apparent in the next paragraph. 
 
Turning to workplace level, in Britain, coverage by a union agreement is associated with 
lesser individual voice, supporting H5a. In France, the widespread use of dual channels is 
likely to affect the impact of both councils and unions on individual voice. For this reason the 
results are shown separately for establishments with the dual channel, and for those with 
either councils or union agreements only. The reference category is establishments without 
workplace  level  channels.  As  anticipated,  councils  in  plants  without  agreements  have  no 
statistically significant effect on individual voice, consistent with H5b, that employees would 
look to the delegates rather than the more remote councils for support on individual issues. 
Union agreements in plants without a council also have no statistically significant effect on 
individual voice, whereas a negative effect was anticipated (H5a). Lack of significance may 
be due in part to the small numbers of such establishments, and that those covered by a union 
agreement, but lacking either a council or delegates, are mostly small, so that union resources 
would be greatly stretched. In contrast, the strongly negative and significant coefficient on 
councils with local union agreements is consistent with hypothesis H6 that strong unions 
exert a solidaristic influence over councils’ dealings with individual voice. Thus, in dual 
channel establishments, the unions’ anticipated negative influence on individual voice seems 
to  be  transmitted  mainly  through  their  joint  action  with  councils.  Without  councils  (and 
delegates), unions are mostly too weak for employees to consider renouncing their individual 
voice, hence the non-significant coefficient. 
 
As an experiment, a similar analysis was undertaken distinguishing delegates in workplaces 
with and without local  agreements.  In both cases, their association with individual voice 
remained  strongly  positive.  Compared  with  councils,  they  appear  to  enjoy  greater 
independence from union pressures. Thus, there appears to be good support for the arguments 
about the roles of the four collective channels in relation to individual voice. Nevertheless, 
some  caution  is  needed  for  the  workplace  level  institutions,  because  dual  channel 
representation is the norm in large establishments. This means that the statistical tests often 
hinge on the minority of large workplaces with weaker representation. This problem does not 15 
arise  for  delegates  and  stewards  because  they  are  separately  present  in  many  small 
workplaces, hence the robustness of the estimates relating to them. 
 
Grievance processes provide insight into the channels for individual employee voice. In both 
countries, handling grievances informally, outside formal procedures, appears to strengthen 
individual voice. For Britain informality was interacted with size to factor out the effects of 
greater formalisation in large workplaces. In France, informal grievance handling is captured 
by  whether  employees  have  direct  access  to  senior  managers  in  order  to  sort  out  work 
problems.  These  results  support  H2  that  greater  access  to  management  boosts  individual 
voice. In contrast, taking grievances through formal channels often deprives employees of 




Turning to the management-led forms of voice (H8), the most striking result under both 
systems is their generally small effect on individual voice: mostly not statistically significant. 
This may be due partly to difficulty of identifying their independence from  management 
using the data available. Interactions with collective voice channels  were computed, in the 
expectation that management-led channels operate with greater independence in the presence 
of  collective  voice  (available  from  the  author).  In  Britain,  m ostly  these  proved  non -
significant. The exception was appraisal, where a positive and significant interaction suggests 
that it may enhance individual voice if local union influence reduces management control. 
The negative coefficient on employee consultation in Britain seems also to reflect the degree 
of management control, even in unionised workplaces, as indicated by a non -significant 
interaction with local agreements.  
 
Among  the  workplace  characte ristics,  high  rates  of  absence  were  associated  with  low 
individual voice in Britain. Absence is often interpreted as a form of silent protest (Edwards, 
1979) hence indicating a lack of voice. Turnover was negative but not significant. In France, 
there was no significant effect of either variable, but this may be due to reliance on indirect 
measures. A high cost of turnover, signalled by employer provided training, was positive and 
significant for Britain, and positive, but not significant for France.  In neither country did the 
somewhat crude indicators of work organisation, job autonomy and use of computers, appear 
to show much effect on employee individual voice. In both countries, individual voice was 
strongest in small establishments, and declined steadily as size increased. 
 
Several robustness checks were carr ied out. The first concerns whether the results can be 
replicated for other years. In neither country has workplace representation been static, and it 
could be that the 2004 data simply reflect unusual conditions in that year (Amossé and Wolff, 
2008). For  this reason, the regression analysis was repeated using the results of the 1998 
surveys for the two countries. Most of the variables could be matched owing to considerable 
stability in the design of the two surveys. The key results were confirmed: in Brita in, union 
stewards and local union agreements maintained their negative relationship with individual 
voice, and in France, union stewards were again found to bear a negative relationship with 
individual voice, and personnel delegates, a positive one. In all cases, the relationships were 
statistically significant (Appendix Table 4). The one exception concerns the solidaristic 
                                                 
9 There  is  a  positive  interaction  with  union  presence,  not  included  in  the  Table  4a  analysis,  which  signals 
increased likelihood that such procedures are joint, which is consistent with Batt’s findings. 16 
influence of unions that prevailed over works councils leading to lesser individual voice in 
dual-channel  establishments.  In  1998,  this  was  not  statistically  significant.  This  may  be 
because the influence of unions over councils in large establishments has grown in recent 
years (Amossé and Wolff, 2009), and that 1998 was at an earlier stage in this trajectory. 
 
The second check concerns the effect of employment size. In France, workplace size is the 
deciding criterion on the right to representation by personnel delegates and works councils. In 
addition, much of the variation in representational patterns is related to size. This raises the 
possibility that the apparent impact of the statutory model on individual voice is spurious: 
individual voice is strongest in small units, and it just happens that this is where personnel 
delegates are most strongly implanted. However, the analysis by size (Appendix Table 3) 
shows  that  the  difference  between  stewards  and  delegates  is  to  be  found  also  in  small 
establishments,  and  the  negative  and  significant  coefficient  on  councils  with  local  union 
agreements was sustained in medium-sized workplaces. Non-significance in small and large 
establishments could be anticipated: councils and local agreements are the exception in small 
establishments below the legal threshold, and in large ones, multiple channels make separate 
estimation difficult. 
 
Thirdly, one has to ask why the effects of the selected variables should be generally much 
stronger and more significant in Britain than in France, and explain so much more of the 
overall variance individual voice, 15% as compared with 3% (Table 4, pseudo r
2). The main 
reason is that the number of employee respondents in each workplace was much smaller in 
France than in Britain, averaging respectively 3 and 15, leading to larger standard errors in 
the dependent variable. Note that the unit of observation in Table 4 is the employee. As a 
check, the same equation was run, this time with the establishment as unit of observation, 
using  establishment  means  of  individual  voice  for  workplaces  at  least  five  employee 
respondents  and  substituting  the  establishment’s  occupational  composition  for  employee 
occupation (details available from the author). This cuts the sample establishments by 10% in 
Britain, but by 85% in France, although the size ranges remain fairly evenly represented. 
Now the full equations of Table 4 for Britain and France explain respectively 37% and 25% 
of the variation in perceived employee voice. The analysis confirms the negative coefficients 
on stewards and union agreements for Britain, although in France, the effect of job level 
representation proves more robust than that of workplace level.
10 Similarly, for 1998, when 
the regressions are run on establishment means instead of individual employee data, the 
analysis confirms the direction of the key relationships with individual voice, and as in 2004, 
the  variance  e xplained  increases  to  38%  and  27%  respectively  in  Britain  and  France 
(Appendix Table 4). 
 
The lesser effect of individual marketability upon individual voice (H7) in France may partly 
reflect measurement differences, but it is also consistent with the underlying argument of this 
paper. First, the more extensive coverage of the statutory voice institutions in France than in 
Britain means that when workers change jobs, there is a much higher probability (70% as 
against 33%, Table 1) that they will enter anoth er workplace that provides collective voice. 
                                                 
10 Despite  the  greatly  reduced  sample,  stewards  maintained  their  negative,  and  delegates,  their  positive 
relationships with individual voice, although only that for stewards is significant. The presence of a council with 
a union agreement had a negative but non-significant relationship. The major difference compared with Table 4 
was a positive, significant, coefficient for local agreements. This was caused by the restricted sample, as was 
shown by running the corresponding employee regressions on the same reduced sample of establishments. 17 
As a result, they are less dependent on maintaining their personal capacity for individual 
negotiation. Secondly, as a result of the employment protection powers of works councils, 
lesser use can be made of dismissal threats in order to police the zone of acceptance. This is 
consistent with the OECD’s employment protection index (EPL) which situates France at one 
extreme and Britain at the other.
11 It is also consistent with a lower proportion of short tenure 
employees in France compared with Britain, as shown by mean job tenures in Appendix 
Table 1, and confirmed by the OECD’s labour force survey based estimates.  In 2004 in 
Britain, 35% of employees had less than three years service compared with 24% in France 
(OECD.stat). In other words, greater employment stability in France is associated with lesser 
use  of  quit  and  dismissal  threats  to  sustain  individual  voice,  and  a  lesser  premium  on 
individual  marketability  than  in  Britain.  This  situation  would  be  acceptable  for  French 
employees owing to the effectiveness of personnel delegates in supporting their individual 
dealings  with  management.  Their  action  can  also  explain  why  the  levels  of  perceived 
individual voice should be roughly similar in both countries despite different constraints on 
the use of dismissal and quit threats (Table 2). 
 
Finally, a number of tests of the validity of the individual voice measure were carried out. 
First, might greater scope for individual voice make employees more satisfied with the pay 
for their work and less likely to quit (H3)? Table 5 regresses pay satisfaction on the actual 
and predicted values of effective individual voice. For each country, the top two rows show 
the effect of perceived individual voice on feeling fairly paid, without and with controls. 
Because of possible halo effects between feeling fairly paid and perceived voice, the analysis 
was repeated using the predicted values of voice from the full variable equations in Table 4. 
Second, it is possible to compute quit rates from the British but not the French survey, and 
the  middle  section  of  Table  5  shows  the  regression  of  establishment  quit  rates  on  mean 
individual voice for establishments with at least ten employee respondents. The results show 
that higher levels of individual voice are indeed associated with lower quit rates. The third 
test uses the idea that employees can obtain a greater return on individual voice in workplaces 
with greater internal pay inequality and where firms can derive rents from their dominant 
product market position
12. The reward policies provide scope for such negotiation, and the 
market power signals the employer’s ability to pay. For France, where suitable earnings data 
are available, it is possible to use the ratio of the 90
th to the 10
th percentile hourly earnings, 
and whether the firm holds more than 50% of its product market. Both variables are positive 
and  significant,  adding  further  confidence  to  the  interpretation  of  the  individual  voice 
measure. 
6. Conclusion 
In conclusion, what can be said about the determinants of individual employee voice, and its 
relationship with representative voice? In both the negotiated and the statutory systems of 
collective voice, two key factors are having a viable outside option and informal access to 
managers who can make decisions, at least as judged by the employees who would exercise 
voice. In both models, the job-level representatives play a key role in helping employees 
                                                 
11 For 2004, the OECD’s employment protection legislation index (EPL version 2) stood at 1.1 for the UK and 
2.85 for France, placing the two countries at either pole: France fifth from the top and the UK fourth from the 
bottom out of 33 industrial countries. 
12 This test was suggested by Barbara Petrongolo.and Joern-Steffen Pischke. Suitable data on within workplace 
pay inequality were not available for Britain, and the market power measures were positive but not significant.  18 
manage their zone of acceptance, although they appear to do so in contrasted ways.  The 
negotiated  model  inhibits  individual  voice  because  stewards  have  to  translate  individual 
concerns into collective ones, whereas the statutory one enhances it because delegates are 
more at liberty to deal with each case on its individual merits. Moving to the workplace level, 
in the negotiated system, union organisation, as reflected by having a collective agreement, 
tends to inhibit individual voice. It was argued that this stems from the need to mobilise in 
order to sustain collective strength vis-à-vis the employer. In the rights-based system, one 
would expect councils to have a less pronounced effect than the job level delegates because 
the latter play the key front-line role, and they are not dependent on councils in the way that 
stewards depend upon their unions. Employment law rather than mobilisation sustains their 
action. Examples of workplaces with councils with and without union agreements can be 
found in France, and it could be argued these approximate to the ideal-type rights-based and 
the dual-channel systems. In the council-only workplaces, the effect on individual voice is 
non-significant,  whereas  in  the  dual-channel  workplaces  it  appears  that  the  unions’ 
solidaristic  orientation  prevails  over  the  councils,  at  least  in  relation  to  individual  voice. 
Nevertheless, some caution is needed because of the relatively small numbers of council-only 
workplaces, and the possibility that they are in some other sense not typical. 
 
Management-led forms of voice, on the evidence of the two countries in this paper, do not 
appear to have much effect on individual voice either to enhance it or to diminish it. The 
main exception relates to grievance procedures,  and how they affect individual access to 
senior managers. The negative coefficient on formal grievance procedures in Britain, it was 
suggested, reflects how they can restrict the informal access and so restrict individual voice. 
The  lack  of  association
1 between individual voice and management -led forms does not 
preclude other benefits that  management may derive  from them, such as information and 
motivation observed in other studies. 
 
Before  concluding  that the logics  of mobilisation  and  representation rights  explain  the 
different effects of the voluntary   and statutory models  on individual voice a number of 
possible counter arguments should be considered. The first is that the difference between the 
countries may reflect the influence of variables  omitted from the surveys, such as national 
differences in the economic environment. This would not explain why the job level stewards 
and delegates  in France have  their  contrasted  effects, this being one of the most robust 
findings in the regressions. The second is that the difference between the British and French 
results may simply reflect the predominance of non -union workplaces in the British private 
sector. However, while this could explain the greater influence of marketability in Britain, it 
would not explain why shop stewards have a negative association with individual voice in 
both countries.  
 
The findings revealed by the employee questionnaires for Britain and France  shed new light 
on individual voice within employment relationships and show that it is much more extensive 
than is often supposed, even within environments where collective voice is fairly developed. 
They suggest also that the dichotomy between no voice and collective voice needs to be 
reviewed, and that management-led voice has not been very effective at  fostering greater 
individual voice. Beyond their intellectual interest, these findings also raise  questions about 
employee well-being. Does  it matter that employees in the voluntary regime  should be so 
much more dependent on individual voice tha n their counterparts in the statutory one? The 
evidence of this paper suggests that those who lack marketable skills and are in workplaces 19 
without  representation  may  well  be  faced  with  the  stark  choice  between  languishing  in 
silence and the greater risks entailed by absence and quits. 20 
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8. Tables and Charts 
Table 1. Voice institutions in Britain and France in 2004 
% of all estabs (private with >=20 employees)  
 Britain  France 
  %     % 
Shop steward:  >=20 
                         20-99 




Delegate:    >=20 
                   20-99 
                  >=100 
 
Steward:   >=20 
                   20-99 
                  >=100 
 












Employment size : 
>=20  
20-49 
50-99   
>=100 
>=50 
Consultation +  
- Local agreement 






















- Local agreement 













Coverage by a collective 
















agreement negotiated in 

































Source:  WERS  and  REPONSE  2004,  Management  questionnaires,  private  establishments 
with  >=20  employees,  using  establishment  weights.  France:  figures  in  parentheses  for 
councils include ‘délégation unique’ in which the functions of delegates and councils are 
merged, which the law allows for establishments with 50-199 employees. These represent 
13% of private establishments with >=20 employees. Figures for delegates include délégation 
unique. 
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Table 2. Employees’ Perceived Individual Voice 
 
Table 2a. Britain: Percentage of Employees Stating they would be Best Represented by 
‘Myself’ 
  All estabs  Estabs with a 
recognised TU 
Estabs with no 
recognised TU 
% of employees replying ‘I would be 
best represented by myself’ on the 
following issues: 
%  %  % 
Getting increases in my pay  49.9  33.9  59.8 
Getting training  68.9  67.3  69.9 
If I wanted to make a complaint about 
working here 
60.9  51.1  67.0 
If a manager wanted to discipline me  47.4  32.9  56.5 
 
Private estabs with >=20 employees. Employee respondents= 12,942. Employee weights 
 
 
Table 2b. France: Employee, Representative, and Management Views whether 
Employees can Defend their Interests Themselves 





















All estabs     
  %  %  %  %  % 
Disagree 
strongly 
17.2  26.9  26.0  19.5  2.3 
Disagree  19.2  24.8  24.2  28.3  10.3 
Neutral  19.2  11.1  12.0  0.7  1.7 
Agree  22.9  26.1  25.8  30.5  46.8 
Agree 
strongly 
21.5  11.0  12.0  21.0  38.9 
Total agree  44.4  37.1  37.8  51.5  85.7 
Total  100  100  100  100  100 
 
Employee questionnaire Q 20. ‘Les salariés sont en mesure de défendre directement leurs 
intérêts’. Elected representative institutions comprise delegates, and works councils. 
Private establishments with >=20 employees. N=7132. 25 
Table 3. First and Second Ports of Call for Individual Grievances Relating to Working 
Conditions: France 
  First port of call  % of 
estabs 
Second port of call  Of 
which 
% 
      No further discussion  42 
  Senior Management  25  Mid-Mgt   34 
      Delegate/Council  16 
      Colleague  6 
         
      Senior Mgt   52 
  Middle Management  48  No further discussion   9 
      Delegate/Council  26 
      Health & safety cttee  4 
Individual grievance 
on working conditions 
       
      Senior Mgt  26 
  Delegate/Council  18  Mid-Mgt  51 
      Health & safety cttee  11 
      Shop steward  5 
         
      Senior Mgt   16 
  Shop steward  3  Mid-Mgt   29 
      Delegate/Council   41 
      Health & safety cttee  8 
 
Q 8.6a: in this establishment, to whom do employees go first for individual problems relating 
to working conditions (safety, work pace, working time)? (Management respondents). 
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Table 4a. Determinants of Perceived Employee Individual Voice in Britain 2004  
Perceived individual voice   Coef.    Coef.    Coef.    Coef.    Coef.   
Employee individual voice 
supports                     
Years of education   0.020   ****      0.026   ****  0.028   ****  0.032   **** 
Pay> average for my occupation   0.284   ****      0.359   ****  0.298   ****  0.299   **** 
Mgr/Professional   0.825   ****      0.811   ****  0.877   ****  0.883   **** 
Technician   0.455   ****      0.446   ****  0.518   ****  0.494   **** 
Admin/sales   0.182   ****      0.175   ****  0.249   ****  0.232   **** 
Semi/unskilled manual   -0.271   ****      -0.290   ****  -0.188   ****  -0.176   **** 
Length of service (log)   -0.106   ****      -0.064   ****  -0.072   ****  -0.062   **** 
Representative voice                     
Union steward      -0.473   ****  -0.366   ****  -0.366   ****  -0.359   **** 
Estab level pay agreement       -0.262   ****  -1.535   ****  -1.432   ****  -1.476   **** 
Grievance handling                     
Formal procedure          -0.418   ****  -0.254   **  -0.343   **** 
- and coll agt          1.301   ****  1.194   ****  1.188   **** 
Grievances handled informally           0.463   ****  0.378   **  0.309   * 
 - informality *  size          -0.076   ****  -0.059   *  -0.047   - 
Management-led voice                     
Teams          -0.082   -  -0.077   -     
Quality circles          0.017   -  0.000   -     
Workplace meetings          0.012   -  0.043   -     
Appraisal scheme          -0.035   -  0.051   -     
Consultative committee          -0.337   ****  -0.300   ****     
Job characteristics                     
Job autonomy               0.142   -     
Use of computers               -0.053   -     
Establishment characteristics                     
Training intensity              -0.104   -     
Plant pay > industry average               0.076   *     
Turnover rate/problems               -0.164   -     
Absence rate/problems               -0.871   ****  -0.977   **** 
                     
Constant   -0.489   -  0.244   -  0.166   -  0.168   -  0.138   - 
                     
Size dummies  no    no    no    yes    yes   
Sector dummies  no    no    no    yes    Yes   
                     
Pseudo r2  0.0869    0.0486    0.1460    0.1610    0.1491   
No of observations  12881    12942    12238    11862    12881   
Clusters  882    882    836    807    882   
 









                                                                                                                                                        
1  
Table 4b. Determinants of Perceived Employee Individual Voice in France 2004  
Perceived 
individual 
voice   Coef.    Coef.    Coef.    Coef.    Coef   
Coef   
Individual 
voice supports                     






*     
-
0.015   * 
-
0.012   - 
-
0.012   + 
-






*     
-
0.061   - 
-
0.024   - 
-
0.028   - 
-
0.036   - 
Mgr/Profession
al   0.052   -      0.104   -  0.208  
***
*  0.217  
***





0.051   -     
-
0.019   -  0.041   -  0.044   -  0.020   - 
Admin/sales  
-
0.039   -     
-
0.068   -  0.004   -  0.007   - 
-
0.003   - 
Semi/unskilled 
manual   0.018   -      0.024   -  0.029   -  0.030   -  0.035   - 
Other 
occupations  0.090   -      0.064   -  0.133   -  0.143   *  0.140   * 
Length of 
service (log)  
-
0.022   -      0.001   - 
-
0.003   - 
-
0.003   - 
-
0.003   - 
Representativ
e voice                     
   






















delegate      0.196  
***
*  0.195  
***
*  0.197  
***
*  0.932  
***
*  0.704  
***
* 
Merged PD & 
CE      0.038   -  0.027   -  0.083   -  0.067   -  0.065   - 
Council & no 
local agt     
-
0.103   - 
-
0.108   - 
-
0.038   - 
-
0.126   -  0.004   - 
Council & 










0.144   * 
-
0.527   + 
-
0.141   * 
Local agt/ no 
council      0.023   -  0.045   -  0.041   - 
-
0.052   -  0.033   - 
Grievances                         
Grievances 
handled 
informally       0.118  
***
*  0.119  
***
*  0.110  
***
*  0.103  
***




led voice                     
   
Teams         
-
0.060   - 
-
0.050   - 
-
0.053   - 
   
Quality circles          0.040   -  0.024   -  0.020   -     
Workplace 
meetings         
-
0.064   - 
-
0.057   - 
-
0.049   - 
   
Appraisal 
scheme         
-
0.108   *** 
-
0.029   - 
-
0.027   - 
   
Job 
characteristics                     
   
Job autonomy              
-
0.069   - 
-
0.072   - 
   
Use of 
computers              
-
0.109   - 
-
0.125   * 
   28 
Establishment 
characteristics                     
   
Training 
intensity              0.127   -  0.129   + 
   
Plant pay > 
industry aver             
-
0.035   - 
-
0.030   - 
   
Turnover 
rate/problems              
-
0.029   - 
-
0.030   - 
   
Absence 
rate/problems              
-
0.034   - 
-
0.029   - 
   
Perceived 
individual 
voice   Coef.    Coef.    Coef.    Coef.    Coef   
Coef   
Interactions: 






0.123   ** 
Steward*size                  0.185  
***
*  0.199  
***
* 
                         
Council/Agt 
status *size  No    No    No    No    Yes    No 
 
Size dummies  No    No    No    Yes    Yes    Yes   
Sector 
dummies  No     No     No     Yes    Yes    Yes 
 
                         
Pseudo r2 
0.004
5   
0.015
3   
0.020
2   
0.027
7   
0.030





observations  7132    7616    7094    7073    7073    7123 
 
Clusters  2522    2568    2507    2498    2498    2519   
 
Unit of observation: employees. Probit estimates, based on clustered robust standard errors allowing 
standard errors to vary between sampling units. Size categories: 20-49, 50-99, 100-199, 200-499, 500-
999, >=1000. Omitted categories: skilled manual, size 20-49 and manufacturing. Interactions 
between log size and representative coverage in Britain were not significant, and so not 
included. They were included for France because of the more complex relationships between 
representative institutions and size. 





Table 5. Individual Voice: Pay Satisfaction, Quits, and Pay Inequality Within 
Establishments 
Perceived individual voice  Regression  
Coefficients  Sig  R2  n  clusters 
 
GB: pay satisfaction        Employees   
Actual values (no controls)  0.264   ****  0.0081  12,942  882 
Actual values (controls)  0.181   ****  0.0432  11,816  807 
Predicted values  0.634   ****  0.0094  11,816  807 
 
France: pay satisfaction           
Actual values (no controls)  0.415   ****  0.0187  7,625  2,571 
Actual values (controls)  0.449   ****  0.0613  7,123  2,519 
Predicted values  4.304   -  0.0411  7,123  2,519 
 
GB: Voluntary quits       
Establish- 
ments   
No controls  -0.0956  ***  0.0202  688  Na 
Controls included  -0.0908  **  0.2685  688  na 
 
France        Employees   
Establishment hourly pay dispersion  
p90/p10 all employees in estab  0.0015  *  0.0317  5843  2069 
Degree of competition  
(supplies >50% of product market)  0.1115  ** 
Same  
regression  5843  2069 
 
Notes: Pay satisfaction: probit coefficients, using a binary pay satisfaction variable, with and 
without the full set of Table 3 variables. The predicted values were derived from the Table 4 
equations,  excluding  interactions.  Robust  standard  errors  were  allowed  to  vary  between 
establishments (clusters). 
Quits:  OLS  regression  of  the  per  cent  of  resignations  on  establishment  mean  values  of 
perceived individual voice; limited to establishments with at least ten employee respondents. 
Controls included occupational composition, log seniority and employment size, and sector. 
Data on resignations are not available in Réponse. Robust standard errors.  
Hourly earnings: for France provided for 80% of sample establishments by the DARES from 
the DADS earnings series. Probit coefficients were computed by including them in the same 
regressions as in Table 4, including sector controls. 
Significance: **** 1%; *** 2%; ** 5%; * 10%. 
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10. Appendix 1. The Two Surveys 
WERS  (Workplace  Employment  Relations  Survey)  and  REPONSE  (Relations 
Professionnelles  et  Négociations  d’Entreprise)  are  surveys  are  based  on  representative 
samples of establishments in Great  Britain and France. The surveys were carried for the 
Department  for Trade  and  Industry (DTI), Advisory Conciliation  and Arbitration Service 
(ACAS), the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), and the Policy Studies Institute 
(PSI) in Britain, and the DARES of the Ministry of Labour in France.  
 
The  two  surveys  share  the  same  general  design,  comprising  information  collected  by 
questionnaire from the establishment’s management, usually the top manager or the human 
resources  manager,  from  employee  representatives  and  from  a  sample  of  individual 
employees  within  each  establishment.  For  the  sample  used  in  this  paper,  that  is  private 
establishments with 20 or more employees, in Britain and France, the samples included about 
1,200 and 2,800 establishments respectively. In both countries, the employee questionnaire 
obtained  about  12,000  replies,  however,  in  France,  only  two  thirds  could  be  linked  to 
establishments.  
 
The analysis in this paper uses the establishment and employee weights provided to adjust for 
sample stratification and a measure of non-response. More information about the surveys can 
be found in Kersley et al (2006) for WERS 2004 and in Amossé et al (2008) for REPONSE. 
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Appendix Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations of Key Variables (Employee Sample 
2004) 
  n        France       
  mean  sd  min  Max  mean  sd  min  max 
Employee individual voice supports  0.50  0.50  0  1  0.38  0.49  0  1 
Years of education   13.59  2.54  11  18  13.52  2.76  8  19 
Pay> average for my occupation   0.50  0.50  0  1  0.36  0.48  0  1 
Mgr/Professional   0.21  0.41  0  1  0.18  0.38  0  1 
Technician   0.13  0.34  0  1  0.18  0.38  0  1 
Admin/sales   0.27  0.44  0  1  0.18  0.39  0  1 
Semi/unskilled manual   0.29  0.45  0  1  0.17  0.38  0  1 
Other occupations  -  -  -  -  0.06  0.24  0  1 
Length of service (log)   1.29  1.17  -0.69  2.71  2.03  1.04  0  3.81 
Representative voice                 
Union steward  0.32  0.46  0  1  0.65  0.48  0  1 
Estab level pay agreement   0.37  0.48  0  1  0.78   0.41   0  1 
Personnel delegate  -  -  -  -  0.74  0.44  0  1 
Combined PD/WC  -  -  -  -  0.13  0.34   0  1 
Employee consultation  0.43  0.49  0  1  -  -  -  - 
Works council no agt  -  -  -  -  0.07  0.25  0  1 
Works council & local agt  -  -  -  -  0.55  0.50  0  1 
Local agt no works council  -  -  -  -  0.23  0.42  0  1 
Ma-gement-led voice                 
Teams  0.85  0.36  0  1  0.25  0.43  0  1 
Quality circles  0.41  0.49  0  1  0.58  0.49  0  1 
Workplace meetings  0.87  0.33  0  1  0.86  0.35  0  1 
Appraisal scheme  0.76  0.38  0  1  0.70  0.40  0  1 
Grievance procedure  0.98  0.15  0  1  -  -  -  - 
Grievances handled informally   0.26  0.44  0  1  0.62  0.49  0  1 
Job characteristics                 
Job autonomy   0.55  0.24  0  1  0.37  0.29  0  1 
Use of computers   0.53  0.28  0.025  0.75  0.43  0.30  0  0.75 
Establishment characteristics                 
Training intensity  0.59  0.28  0  1  0.50  0.24  0.17  1 
Plant pay > industry average   0.49  0.50  0  1  0.40  0.49  0  1 
Turnover rate/problems   0.14  0.15  0  1  0.62  0.48  0  1 
Absence rate/problems   0.04  0.05  0  0.77  0.52  0.50  0  1 
 










Britain  France 
Individual voice   EQ 
‘Ideally, who do you think 
would best represent you in 
dealing with managers here 
about getting increases in 
your pay?’ Response: 
Myself, Trade Union, 
Employee representative 
(non-union), Another 
employee, Somebody else 
Employees are able to 
defend their own interests 
directly; (Les salariés sont 
en mesure de défendre 
directement leurs intérêts) 
(Likert scale: disagree to 
agree strongly (Q 20). 
Satisfaction with pay  EQ 
How satisfied are you with 
the amount of pay you  
receive? Response: Likert 
scale very dissatisfied to 
very satisfied. 
Overall, taking into account 
the effort you put in, do you 
consider that the firm 
recognises your work at its 
true value? (Au final, 
compte tenu des efforts que 
vous faites, estimez-vous 
que l’entreprise reconnaît 
votre travail à sa juste 
valeur ?) Responses : yes 
entirely, yes, no, not at all. 
(Q14) 
Years of education   EQ  Based on highest diploma  Based on highest diploma 
Pay> average for my 
occupation   EQ 
Weekly pay for individual 
compared with average for 
reported occupation 
Hourly pay for individual 
compared with average for 
reported occupation 
Occupation  EQ  Matched GB/F from one-
digit responses 
Matched GB/F from one-
digit responses 
Length of service 
(log)   EQ  Derived from ranges  Derived from year of joining 
Personnel delegate  MQ  n/a  Personnel delegate (délégué 
du personnel) 
Combined PD and 




Works council  MQ  n/a  Works council 
Consultation   MQ  Consultative committee    n/a 
Union steward  MQ  Shop steward  Union steward (délégué 
syndical) 
Estab level pay 
agreement   MQ  Existence of a local pay 
agreement 
Local pay agreement 
(redressé) negotiated in the 






Britain  France 
Appraisal scheme   MQ  Appraisal for some or all 
non-managerial employees 
Appraisal for some or all 
non-managerial employees 
Quality circles   MQ  Use of quality circles  Use of quality circles 
Workplace meetings   MQ  Use of workplace meetings  Use of workplace meetings 
Grievance procedure  MQ   Formal grievance procedure  n/a 
Grievances handled 
informally   MQ 
Derived from whether 
grievances on conditions 
were reported & whether 
grievances had been taken 
through the formal 
procedure. 
Employees take problems 
first to senior management 
Teams   MQ  Teams for majority of 
largest occupational group 
Teams for majority of 
largest occupational group 
Job autonomy   MQ 
Index based on problem-
solving, job discretion & 
control 
Index based on problem-
solving, job discretion & 
control 
Use of computers   MQ  Share of employees using 
computers 
Share of employees using 
computers 
Training intensity   MQ  Days of training in last year 
relative to mean 
Annual expenditure relative 
to mean 
Plant pay > industry 
average   MQ 
Plant average pay > average 
for establishments in the 
same sector 
Plant average pay > average 
for establishments in the 
same sector 
Turnover 
rate/problems   MQ  Labour turnover rate 
Recruitment difficulties 
reported  for 2004 
DIFRECR 
Absence 
rate/problems   MQ  Absence rate (provided by 
respondent) 
Was absence a problem in 




(log)  MQ  Number of employees  Number of employees 
Economic sector  MQ  Sector of establishment, 9 
categories matched GB/F 
Sector of establishment, 9 
categories matched GB/F 
 
Key: EQ, MQ, employee or management questionnaire. LOG: largest occupational group. 
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Appendix Table 3. France: Representative Voice Effects on Individual Voice in 
Different Sized Workplaces  
  <50    50-149    150-    <50  50-149  >=150 
  Coef.    Coef.    Coef.    mean  mean  mean 
Perceived individual voice                0.48  0.38  0.33 
Employee individual voice 
factors                   
Years of education   -0.005   -  0.006   -  -0.027   **  13.30  13.26  13.80 
Pay> average for my occupation   0.023   -  -0.030   -  -0.082   -  0.23  0.29  0.46 
Mgr/Professional   0.275   **  0.350   ****  0.042   -  0.13  0.14  0.23 
Technician   -0.094   -  0.153   -  -0.008   -  0.16  0.15  0.21 
Admin/sales   0.201   *  0.001   -  -0.155   -  0.23  0.20  0.15 
Semi/unskilled manual   -0.108   -  0.104   -  0.067   -  0.16  0.20  0.16 
Other occupation   0.192   -  0.409   ****  -0.099   -  0.08  0.07  0.05 
Length of service (log)   -0.004   -  0.033   -  -0.032   -  1.84  1.98  2.17 
Representative voice channels                   
Union steward  -0.360   ****  -0.123   -  0.132   -  0.23  0.60  0.90 
Personnel delegate  0.237   ****  0.361   ***  -0.185   -  0.59  0.55  0.93 
Combined PD/WC  -0.060   -  0.189   -  0.047   -  0.09  0.34  0.03 
Council & no agt  -0.005   -  -0.064   -  0.139   -  0.05  0.08  0.08 
Council with agt  -0.117   -  -0.216   -  -0.033   -  0.14  0.41  0.85 
Agreement & no council  0.031   -  0.059   -  -0.031   -  0.45  0.32  0.05 
Grievance handling                   
Grievances handled informally   0.155   -  0.092   -  0.068   -  0.79  0.69  0.48 
Size dummies  No    Yes    Yes         
Sector dummies  Yes    Yes    Yes         
                   
Pseudo r2  0.0328    0.0286    0.0188         
N  1622    2002    3499    1622  2002  3499 
Clusters  582    714    1223         
 
Probit  estimates.  Dependent  variable:  perceived  individual  voice.  Robust  standard  errors, 
using establishments as clusters. Unit of observation: employees. With the exception of years 
of  education  and  log  service,  for  all  variables,  a  mean  of  one  is  equivalent  to  100%  of 
employees covered. 
Significance: **** 1%; *** 2%; ** 5%; * 10%. 
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Appendix Table 4. Determinants of Perceived Employee Individual Voice: Comparative 















  Coef.    Coef.    Coef.    Coef.   
Representative voice 
channels 
               
Job-level channels                 
Union steward  -0.336   ****  -0.953   ****  -0.704   **  -3.792   **** 
Personnel delegate          0.633   *  3.589   **** 
Union steward * size          0.116   *  0.744   **** 
Personnel delegate * size          -0.149   *  -0.927   **** 
Workplace level channels                 
Local / Estab pay 
agreement 
-0.335   ****  -1.019   ****         
Council & no agt          0.783   -  -2.859   - 
Council with agt          0.451   -  0.706   - 
Agreement & no council          0.703   -  -0.273   - 
                 
Interactions: size with 
Council/Agt status 
No    No    Yes  ns  Yes  ns 
Size dummies  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
Sector dummies  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
                 
Pseudo R2  0.1783    0.3769    0.0367    0.272   
N  16329    966    5512    568   
Clusters  1015    Na    960    Na   
 
Notes:  Dependent  variable:  perceived  individual  voice.  Explanatory  variables  and  probit 
estimation methods: as in the full regressions of Tables 4. Interactions between log size and 
agreement coverage in Britain were not significant, and so not included. They were included 
for France because of the more complex relationships between representative institutions and 
size. The first set of estimates for each country are based on individual employees, and the 
second  set,  on  establishment  means.  To  compute  establishment  means  for  perceived 
individual  voice  analysis  was  restricted  to  establishments  with  at  least  5  employee 
respondents to the employee questionnaire. Significance: **** 1%; *** 2%; ** 5%; * 10% 
 
Source: WERS and Reponse 1998, private sector establishments with 20 or more employees.  
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